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Abstract
In this paper we study a new factor that matters for fertility and consumption decisions:
the risks associated with having and raising a child. We analyze a real options model
with incomplete markets to explicitly model both children as a risky investment and the
parental option to time fertility. We focus on CRRA preferences and uninsurable shocks
to future parental income and to the costs of raising a child. We obtain several results
that are new relative to the standard Beckerian fertility framework where children are
deterministic goods: i) Independently of wealth, higher child cost volatility diminishes
fertility. ii) Consumption is decreasing in higher cost volatility but the slope attens as
wealth increases. iii) Wealth alters the way in which the agents risk tolerance impacts
the fertility and consumption decisions. For low wealth levels, risk aversion speeds up
fertility and lowers consumption with children serving as an utility insurance mechanism.
iv) Fertility is increasing in the correlation between income and child cost shocks. v) The
sign of this correlation determines if higher income volatility speeds up or delays fertility.
vi) Fertility is U-shaped in the income over wealth ratio. Finally, we use regression analysis
to provide empirical support for the theoretical results.
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1 Introduction
Having children is a risky investment because it is not possible to exactly know ex-ante
the costs associated with raising a child (including the opportunity cost of the parentstime
and the e¤ects on their career paths) or the benets that they will provide. For example, no
parent may know in advance how often their children will get ill and how much money and
time this will cost;1 if their children will need extra support at school, get fellowships that
lower education costs or even become child actors and bring millions of dollars to the family.
Markets are incomplete and do not insure most of these contingencies, especially those related
to the time costs for the parents. Hence, children risks are at most partially insurable, and
childbearing brings a new source of shocks to the parents.
In this paper we study the consequences for fertility and consumption of taking into account
that children are a source of risk that interacts with other risks borne by the parents. By doing
so, we make two contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on the economics of
fertility. This literature has followed Gary Beckers seminal work in modelling children as
deterministic normal goods, without considering that children are also a stochastic asset.2 Our
study enlarges the set of e¤ects that drive fertility decisions.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the real options approach to investment in incom-
plete markets. We study the problem of an innitely-lived household who has an initial level of
assets and every period gets some stochastic income, that we assume exogenous for simplicity.
She gets utility from consumption and can save at the risk free rate. The decision to have a
child is like the decision to exercise an option. She can decide to have a child or to postpone
the decision. If she has a child then she is acquiring an irreversible, durable and non-tradable
asset that gives her utility, but implies some stochastic exogenous costs.3 We focus on the
uncertainty about childrens costs and assume that the utility ow is deterministic, as people
can anticipate how much they will enjoy being parents. We assume CRRA preferences because
this allows us to study the e¤ects of wealth in the decisions. Markets are incomplete, because
only the risk-free asset is available for investment.
1The 2008 National Health Interview Survey, reports that roughly 30% of the children missed 1 or 2 school
days, 30% missed 3-5 days and 10% more than 6 days. These numbers are quite robust to di¤erences in income,
race or education of the parents. These results indicate that there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in childrens
health due to unpredictable shocks.
2Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) are examples of recent work within the
Beckerian framework. Jones et al. (2008) and Tamura (2000) survey the literature on the economics of fertility.
3These are realistic assumptions given that once a child is born is very costly to get rid of her because of
sentimental reasons and legal constraints. Moreover, children do not depreciate and it takes several years before
they can live independently.
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Our main theoretical results are the following: i) Independently of wealth, higher cost
volatility diminishes fertility. ii) Consumption is decreasing in higher child cost volatility but
the slope attens as wealth increases.4 iii) Wealth alters the way in which the households risk
attitude impacts the fertility and consumption decisions. For low wealth levels, risk aversion
speeds up fertility and lowers consumption. iv) Fertility is increasing in the correlation between
income and child cost shocks. v) The sign of this correlation determines whether higher income
volatility speeds up or delays fertility. vi) Fertility is U-shaped in the income over wealth ratio.
Moreover, we conrm two well known results since Beckers pathbreaking work. First, if
there is no quality-quantity trade-o¤ and children are normal goods then higher income growth
increases fertility.5 This is the standard income e¤ect. Second, higher expected costs of raising
a child speed up fertility. This is the standard substitution e¤ect in an intertemporal dimension.
Our main results come from the interplay of four e¤ects that di¤er from the standard income
and substitution e¤ects: i) As in any real options problem, having the option to time investment
implies asymmetric convex payo¤s ("in bad times do not exercise and wait for good times to
come"). This pushes the household to delay fertility as volatility increases. ii) If the fertility
option is exercised the child costs can be thought as an income shock. Incomplete markets and
preferences displaying precautionary savings push the household to delay fertility to avoid new
sources of risk. iii) Having a child is an alternative source of utility that can hedge uctuations
in goods consumption. This is an important characteristic of children when we think of them
as an asset class. This channel pushes the household for early fertility to enjoy the children as
an insurance mechanism. iv) When the income and cost shocks are correlated, the sign of the
correlation determines if the shocks hedge or add up each other. Fertility speeds up when the
shocks hedge each other.
Our analysis o¤er new insights on the determinants of fertility that may help both in explain-
ing facts and in the design of pronatalist policies. For example, Stetsenko (2010) documents
that U.S. fertility changed from being countercyclical to being procyclical as female labor sup-
ply increased. This is consistent with our model, because the increase in female labor supply
implies a negative correlation between child and income shocks. On the policy side, our theory
provides support for policies that reduce the uninsurable uncertainty from raising a child (such
as child care programs) and the negative correlation between income and child costs shocks (as
4If preferences were CARA, instead of CRRA, the decision boundaries would be independent of wealth.
Hence wealth would have no e¤ect on how risk aversion a¤ects the agents decision.
5For simplicity we did not model this tradeo¤ because it would imply that childrens costs are endogenous.
This assumption does not seem problematic since our goal is to study how changes in the uncertainty associated
with the cost of a child, and the correlation of this uncertainty with the income uncertainty, a¤ect both the
decision to have a child and the savings patterns. Moreover, we express the optimal fertility decision as a
fraction of wealth.
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State-paid leaves of absence to insure the parents career from children health shocks).
Our solution method does not allow for quantitative results. Hence, to bring the theory
to the data, we use regression analysis.6 To do so, we identify a variable that can serve as a
proxy for the uninsurable volatility in the costs associated with raising a child. We focus on
the distance of the grandparents to the parents. There are two main arguments to support this
choice. First, a large fraction of the uninsurable risks of child rearing seems related to the time
costs for the parents. This was especially true in the U.S. in the late 1980s, when concerns
that child care was in short supply, not of good enough quality, and too expensive for many
families prompted the enactment of legislation in 1990 that expanded Federal support for child
care (U.S. House, Committee on Ways and Means 2000). Second, Cardia and Ng (2003) and
Rupert and Zanella (2010) have documented that grandparents make substantial time transfers
in the form of care of their grandchildren. Hence, we assume that households whose parents
live closeby face less uncertainty from the time costs shocks associated with raising a child. We
use this variable as a proxy for child cost risk.
Our data are the 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). We focus on
fertility decisions made in the last year. We obtain several results consistent with our theory:
i) The higher the distance to parents the smaller the likelihood of childbearing. Distance is
signicant in all our probit specications that also control for variables commonly associated
with the decision to have a child or not, such as income, wealth, income over wealth, age of
the householder, race, religion and education. We interpret this result as evidence that higher
cost volatility reduces fertility. ii) Wealth plays an important role in the fertility decision. Less
wealthy households are less a¤ected by high levels of child costs risk. This is consistent with
our theory, in which children can serve as an insurance mechanism. iii) The marginal e¤ect on
fertility of risk tolerance (proxied by the ratio of stock holdings relative to wealth) is negative
for low wealth households and positive for medium/high wealth households. iv) The sample
correlation between income and parental distance is signicantly positive across households who
had a child in the last year, while it is negligible across those who did not.
This paper is related and contributes to two di¤erent literatures:
A) To the literature on the economics of fertility. We believe that ours is the rst model in
which a child is a stochastic asset associated with an investment option. Our innovation is
to study how the risks coming from children themselves a¤ect fertility and savings. More-
6It is not possible to obtain a closed form solution of the model. We solve it by extending to a real options
framework the approximation method proposed by Kogan and Uppal (2002) and Bhamra et al. (2007). It
consists in a power series expansion of the fertility decision boundary with respect to relative risk aversion,
around the logarithmic case.
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over, our work complements both the literature that has studied the e¤ects of income
uncertainty on fertility (see Kreyenfeld 2005 for a survey, and Sommer 2009 for a recent
contribution), and the literature studying children as an insurance mechanism (Portner
2005 surveys theoretical and empirical work). We show that the e¤ects of income uncer-
tainty on fertility depend on how this uncertainty correlates with child rearing risks. And
we show that children can be used by low wealth households as an insurance asset even
if children do not provide another source of household income, neither take care of the
parents (these are the main arguments in models where children provide insurance). In
our model children hedge utility uctuations because they provide a safe ow of utility.
B) To the real options approach to investment. This literature has become a workhorse in
nance to study investment decisions that are partially or completely irreversible, imply
uncertain future costs or rewards, and have a exible investment timing.7 This literature
studies the opportunity to invest in a real project as an American call option on the
underlying investment project, that can be analyzed using no-arbitrage relationships as
in the Black-Merton-Scholes model. However, these techniques do not work when the
assets (the children in our case) are nontradable and nancial markets are incomplete,
i.e. markets do not provide assets to replicate the payo¤s of having a child.8 In this case
the model has to be solved using dynamic programming. Few papers have studied real
options under incomplete markets. We are only aware of Chen et al. (2010), Henderson
(2007), Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) and Miao and Wang (2007). Miao and Wang
(2007) is the paper more closely related to our work because they study simultaneously
the consumption/savings decision and the option to invest. They focus on CARA prefer-
ences and analyze a real options problem in which the decision maker faces uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk from his investment opportunity. We di¤er on two dimensions: i) we
focus on CRRA preferences. This allows us to study how the households wealth a¤ects
fertility and consumption decisions. ii) In our setup, the investment payo¤s come both
as deterministic ows of altruistic utility and as stochastic monetary costs, while in their
model the household pays a deterministic cost to receive a stochastic ow payo¤. In their
case, stronger precautionary savings motives implied by higher risk aversion always delay
investment, while we show that this implication can be reversed because of wealth e¤ects
and the insurance associated with the deterministic altruistic utility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 describes the model and the solution method.
7An American call option is a nancial contract in which the buyer of the call option has the right, but not
the obligation, to buy an agreed quantity of a particular commodity, or nancial instrument, from the seller of
the option at any time during the life of the option for a certain price.
8Dixit and Pindyck (1994) is a textbook survey.
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Section 3 discusses the theoretical results. Section 4 provides a regression test of the model.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs and details on the solution method are in the Appendix.
2 Model and Solution Method
2.1 Model
We analyze a continuous-time, partial equilibrium economy, populated by an innitely-
lived household whose utility function depends on her consumption of goods (ct) and on having
or not a child (It). The household starts without a child and has the option to have it at any
moment. We denote by  the time at which the household decides to have a child. It is an
indicator function that captures the fertility status: it takes the value one if the household has
had a child
It =
(
1 for t  
0 for t < 
(1)
We assume that the utility function is separable into a felicity component arising from goods
consumption and a felicity component arising from the fertility status. We assume Constant
Relative Risk Aversion for the consumption component
u(ct; It) =

c1 t   1
1  

  It   1
1   ;  > 1;  > 0 (2)
where  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient and  > 1 is a parameter that captures the
utility benet from having a child. Higher levels of  imply smaller utility benets.
Every period the household earns a stochastic labor income stream (yt) : Moreover, if she
has had a child she must pay the stochastic costs (qt) associated with child rearing. We model
the dynamics of these two processes as Geometric Brownian motions
dyt
yt
= ydt+ ydB
y
t (3)
dqt
qt
= qdt+ qdB
q
t (4)
E[dByt dB
q
t ] = dt (5)
Both income and costs are denominated in units of the consumption good that we take as
numeraire. Byt and B
q
t are two Wiener processes whose correlation coe¢ cient is : The para-
meters y and q denote the deterministic growth rates of income and the cost of a child. The
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parameters y and q denote the volatilities of these processes.
We assume that markets are not complete and the household cannot hedge against child
cost or labor income risk because she can only transfer consumption over time investing in a
riskless asset. We denote by r the constant instantaneous risk-free rate. Hence the wealth (W )
of the household evolves as
dWt = (rWt + yt   qtIt   ct)dt (6)
The household maximizes time-additive expected utility over consumption and her parental
status, i.e. she decides two things: if and when to have a child; and how much to consume and
save every period. Assuming a discount rate equal to the interest rate, the household problem
is
H(W0; q0; y0) = max
c;
E
Z 1
0
e rtu(ct; It)dt

(7)
s:t:
(3)  (6)
2.2 Solving the model
The problem has a recursive nature. Conditional on having or not having a child, the
households decisions depend on her wealth, income and the cost of the child. These are the
state variables of the problem. We solve the households decision problem backward by dynamic
programming. Let H(W; q; y) and J(W; q; y) denote the households value functions before and
after the decision to have a child, respectively. After the fertility decision, the value function is
J(W; q; y) = max
c
E
Z 1
0
e rsu(cs; 1)ds

(8)
s:t: (3)  (6)
By a dynamic programming argument, the function J solves the following Hamilton-Bellman-
Jacobi equation (HBJ)
rJ(W; q; y) = max
c
u(c; 1) + (rW + y   q   c)JW+ (9)
+ Jyyy + Jqqq +
Jyy
2
y22y +
Jqq
2
q22q + Jqyyqqy
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subject to the transversality condition
lim
T!1
E[J(WT ; qT ; yT )] = 0 (10)
As in the option pricing literature, we dene a continuation region, f(W; q; y) : H(W; q; y) >
J(W; q; y)g; as the set of realizations of the state variables at which the household is better o¤
without children and the fertility option is worth more alive. Because of (2), we can write the
value function in the continuation region, before the decision to have a child, in the form
H(W; q; y) = V (W; q; y) +
1
(1  )r (11)
where V (W; q; y) is the value function before the decision to have a child but net of the utility
that the child would provide if the option is exercised. V (W; q; y) satises the following HBJ
equation
rV (W; q; y) = max
c
c1    1
1   + (rW + y   c)VW+ (12)
+ Vyyy + Vqqq +
Vyy
2
y22y +
Vqq
2
q22q + Vqyyqqy;
where VW ; Vy and Vq are rst order partial derivatives, and Vyy; Vqq; Vqy second order partial
derivatives.
V (W; q; y) also satises the following no-bubble condition
lim
q!1
V (W; q; y) = V 0(W; y); (13)
where
V 0(W; y) = max
c
E
Z 1
0
e rsu(cs; 0)ds

(14)
s:t: (3)  (6) : (15)
Condition (13) states that if the cost of having a child approaches innity the household
will never exercise the option, thus her value function must converge to the value function of a
consumption/savings problem with stochastic income and no fertility option (V 0).
The complement of the continuation region is the fertility region: f(W; q; y) : H(W; q; y) =
J(W; q; u)g. It is the set of realizations of the state variables at which the household wants to
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have a child. This set is closed,9 and its boundary is the region of immediate childbearing, or
simply the fertility boundary. To characterize it, note that at the instant of investment, the
following value-matching condition must hold
V (W; q; y) +
1
(1  )r = J(W; q; y) (16)
This equation implicitly denes a three-dimensional (in income, wealth and child cost) decision
boundary. Since the fertility decision implies that costs are going to be incurred, we can think
of this decision as being determined by monitoring the cost level. The household has a child
once the stochastic cost process is equal to or smaller than the decision boundary expressed in
terms of a critical cost that is a function of current income and wealth (q(y;W )).
Moreover, the optimal fertility boundary (q(y;W )) must satisfy the following smooth-
pasting conditions. They state that the marginal change in income, wealth and cost of a
child must have the same marginal e¤ect on the households value functions just before and
immediately after exercising the option
@V (W; q; y)
@y

q=q(y;W )
=
@J(W; q; y)
@y

q=q(y;W )
(17)
@V (W; q; y)
@q

q=q(y;W )
=
@J(W; q; y)
@q

q=q(y;W )
(18)
@V (W; q; y)
@W

q=q(y;W )
=
@J(W; q; y)
@W

q=q(y;W )
(19)
Given the lack of closed-form solutions for our problem, we use an approximate but analytical
solution method proposed by Kogan and Uppal (2002) and Bhamra et al. (2007). It exploits
the fact that if the household has logarithmic preferences ( = 1), then an exact solution
is available. This approximation method consists of a power series expansion of the fertility
decision boundary with respect to relative risk aversion around the logarithmic case. We do a
second-order expansion, therefore the accuracy of the solution decays rapidly if the household
is very risk averse. The next Proposition characterizes optimal fertility and consumption as a
function of income, wealth, and model parameters. The value function and the details of the
derivation are reported in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 To the second order in , the household has a child whenever the cost over
9Assuming that the value function V (w; q; y) is continuous with respect to its arguments.
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wealth ratio, q^ = q=W , crosses the following decision boundary from above:
q =

K3
K3
 1
 1
+ (   1)(A+By^) + (   1)2(AA+BBy^ + CCy^2) (20)
where y^ = y=W . Coe¢ cients (A;AA;B;BB;CC; ;K3; K3) are functions only of the model
parameters (y; q; y; q; r; ; ) and they are reported in the Appendix. Moreover, to the second
order in , the consumption rule of the household before the decision to have a child is
c^ = r + (   1)(U0r2   rlog(r))+ (21)
(   1)2

 U0r2 + U1r2 + U
2
0 r
3
2
+ r log r   U0r2 log r + 1
2
r(log r)2

where c^ = c=W . Functions U0(q^; y^) and U1(q^; y^) are dened, respectively, in equations (44) and
(60) of the Appendix.
The homotheticity property of the CRRA utility of consumption implies that what the
household needs to monitor is cost relative to wealth. As we show in the Appendix, the value
function is monotonically decreasing in the cost over wealth ratio, therefore the childbearing
decision is taken when this ratio crosses the boundary from above.
The rst term in expression (20), corresponds to the zero-th order of the power series.
It is the optimal exercise boundary of an investor with logarithmic utility of consumption
( = 1). This term depends on some constants reported in the Appendix that only depend
on the expected (logarithmic) growth rate of the child rearing cost nanced at the risk-free
rate. This term is independent of income, implying that this investor is willing to accept a cost
that increases linearly in the level of available wealth. The household has a child whenever
the benet deriving from altruistic utility matches the opportunity cost in terms of foregone
consumption.10 This can be seen by analyzing her consumption rule, which is the rst term in
expression (21). The household with log preferences consumes a constant fraction of wealth,
r, which is the marginal opportunity cost of one unit of wealth consumed instead of saved and
invested. This short-sighted consumption policy implies that the opportunity cost of fertility
does not involve income considerations, but only the immediate consumption loss rq incurred
because child rearing is subtracting available wealth at a rate q.
The behavior of the non-logarithmic CRRA preferences ( 6= 1) is substantially more com-
10In the portfolio choice literature, it is well known that log preferences imply myopic investment behavior, in
the sense that the optimal intertemporal portfolio allocation is a sequence of single-period portfolio allocations.
The agent ignores the risk of time-varying investment opportunities. See Brandt (2009).
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plicated. The rst and second order terms in the consumption rule (21) tell us that the child-
bearing option inuences the present consumption rule through the value of the fertility option.
Wealth e¤ects are nontrivial, far from the linear monotonic pattern of the logarithmic investor,
and matter through the rst and the second order terms of the approximation. The next Section
characterizes numerically the childbearing behavior of the household.
3 Theoretical predictions
In this Section we analyze the qualitative predictions of the model. To do so, we x a
reasonable set of parameter values, and we discuss how changes in fundamentals and parameters
a¤ect the households optimal fertility and consumption decisions.
3.1 Parameterization
Table 1 summarizes our benchmark parameterization. We assume the relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient () equal to 2. This value preserves the accuracy of our solution method, and it is
consistent with the literature which models preferences as additively separable in consumption
and the utility derived from the child.11 We set initial income and wealth to the median 2007
U.S. household income and family net worth, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). We
assume that the discount rate equals the interest rate and set the continuously compounded
interest rate at 5% annual. We did not have many references for the preference parameter
; which governs the utility from having a child. We calibrated it in such a way that the
annual utility stream from the fertility decision equals 50% of the annual utility stream from
consumption, assuming a constant consumption equal to the annuity value of wealth (rW ).
Concerning the cost of raising a child, the literature is thin and it has focused on the
deterministic part assuming a tradeo¤ between time and market expenditures in child rearing.
We assume that the costs of rasing a child grow at approximately 2% annually (q = 0:02),
which is also the ination target in many countries. We take as a benchmark that the correlation
() between income and costs is zero and perform comparative statics in the next section. We
set for convenience y = q, y = q and set the volatility of cost growth to 5% (q = 0:05);
which give us a steady state in which the critical cost that triggers fertility, given the rest
of parameters, is roughly 40% of income. This is consistent with Lino (1998), who using the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), estimates that an average dual-earner household with
11See, for example, Becker et al. (1990), or Jones et al. (2008).
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two children between ages 0 and 17 spends roughly 40 percent of the household income on
direct expenses connected with child rearing (e.g., food, housing, education, transportation,
baby-sitting, and day-care).12
Insert Table 1 about here
3.2 Results
In our model the decision to have a child is like the decision to exercise an option. If the
option is exercised the household receives a deterministic stream of altruistic utility from being
a parent and has to pay the stochastic costs associated with raising a child. If the household
exercises the option she foregoes the value of waiting and perhaps exercising the option under
better circumstances. The certainty equivalent of the fertility option (x) provides an assessment
of the value of the fertility option for the household. The certainty equivalent is the additional
initial wealth that the household must be provided to be indi¤erent between having the fertility
option or not.13
V 0(W + x; y) = H(W; q; y) (23)
Given the CRRA preferences, the value of the fertility option is a function of the households
wealth, income and cost of having a child. The certainty equivalent behaves conversely to the
fertility boundary q(y;W ):14 In particular, since fertility is triggered when the cost crosses the
boundary from above, an increase in q means an increase in fertility, because the household is
willing to accept a higher cost in order to have a child. This condition is always associated with
a smaller certainty equivalent, which justies the diminished incentive to wait and postpone
the decision. In the following, we will concentrate on the behavior of the fertility boundary and
consumption described in Proposition 1.
We solve the model with a second order perturbation with respect to relative risk aversion
around the logarithmic utility case ( = 1). The accuracy of the results rely on how close we
are to log utility. We focus on the qualitative patterns.15
12The CEX collects only limited data on expenditures directly attributable to children or childrearing. In
particular, it collects information on childrens clothing, toys, playground equipment, babysitting and daycare.
13Due to the wealth e¤ects of CRRA preferences, this certainty equivalent is related, but does not coincide
with the notion of utility-based option value, xo, usually employed in the asset pricing literature, see Davis
(1997)
V 0(W; y) = V (W   xo; y; q): (22)
14As we discuss in the Appendix the value function is increasing in wealth and decreasing in costs, hence
certainty equivalent and exercise boundary must behave conversely.
15All the parameterizations that we use satisfy the transversality condition (10).
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We start by analyzing the inuence of cost volatility. Figures 1 and 2 report the fertility
boundary and consumption respectively as a function of cost volatility for di¤erent levels of
risk aversion and wealth.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Insert Figure 2 about here
In panels A we set wealth at the benchmark level, while in panels B we consider a high wealth
value that corresponds to the highest percentile of the wealth distribution. All panels report the
decision boundary for three values of the risk aversion parameter. We nd the following results:
i) Independently of wealth, higher cost volatility diminishes fertility. ii) Wealth alters the
way in which the households risk attitude impact the fertility and consumption decisions. iii)
Consumption is decreasing in higher cost volatility but the slope attens as wealth increases.16
These results come from the interplay of three channels:
1) As in any real options problem, having the option to time investment implies asymmetric
convex payo¤s ("in bad times do not exercise and wait for good times to come"). This
makes the value of the option increasing in the cost volatility. And it pushes the household
to delay fertility as volatility increases. More risk averse households value more the option
to "time fertility" because they are more sensitive to the consequences of investing in the
bad state of the world.
2) Once the option is exercised the household starts bearing the uninsurable risk of the
costs of raising a child. The problem of the household becomes a standard incomplete-
markets consumption problem with stochastic income.17 We can read this from equation
(6) thinking on (yt   qt) as income net of children costs: In a complete markets setup
Friedmans permanent-income hypothesis would apply and the household would consume
the annuity value of her expected present and future wealth. However, given that we
assume incomplete markets, and that the household has a precautionary savings motive
( > 0), then she will reduce consumption for precautionary reasons.18 This precautionary
savings channel pushes the household to delay fertility as cost volatility increases. The
delay will be larger the higher the risk aversion. Moreover, wealth will play a role since
16If preferences were CARA instead of CRRA the optimal decisions would be independent of wealth. Hence
wealth would have no e¤ect on how risk aversion a¤ects the agents decision.
17See for example Caballero (1991) and Wang (2006).
18The precautionary savings e¤ect will be present both before and after the option exercise but it has a larger
impact after the option exercise because the option gives the exibility of timing the fertility decision, what is
an insurance against the stochastic child costs.
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precautionary savings are decreasing in wealth (they are less needed when wealth is high).
3) Exercising the option gives a deterministic ow of altruistic utility that is separable from
the utility of goodsconsumption. Hence, a child is an alternative source of utility that can
hedge uctuations in goods consumption. This is an important characteristic of children
when we think of them as an asset class. This channel pushes the household for early
fertility to enjoy the children as an insurance mechanism.
Channels 1 and 2 explain why, for all levels of wealth and risk aversion, in Figure 1 the
fertility decision boundary is decreasing in the volatility of the cost of having a child. Channel
3 explains why for medium or low wealth levels risk aversion speeds up fertility (Figure 1 panel
A). This e¤ect is reversed for high levels of wealth (Figure 1 panel B). Intuitively, when the
household has little wealth to bu¤er negative income shocks, having a child is a way to hedge
future consumption uncertainty. It assures a constant ow of altruistic utility that o¤sets low
consumption levels. Thus, when wealth is medium or low, more risk averse households trigger
fertility sooner, they tradeo¤ utility from fertility against utility from consumption, as reected
in the lower consumption levels in Panel A of Figure 2. However, channel 3 weakens when
wealth is high because the utility ow brought by the child is smaller relative to the utility ow
of consumption. Hence, as channels 1 and 2 predict, in Panel B of Figures 1 and 2 both the
consumption and the fertility are higher the lower the risk aversion.
Figure 3 shows that when income and cost shocks are negatively correlated fertility is lower,
i.e. the decision boundary is monotonically increasing in this correlation. The household is
reluctant to give birth when positive cost shocks come together with bad income shocks. The
reluctance is more pronounced when risk aversion is high. A pronatalist government may
encourage fertility by altering this correlation. For example, a negative correlation may be the
outcome of child illnesses having negative e¤ects on the parentscareers, policies of State paid
leaves in periods of high probability of child illnesses may break the correlation.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Figures 4 and 5 analyze how volatility of income growth a¤ects the childbearing decision
and consumption, respectively. Panel A plots the benchmark case when the correlation between
risks is zero ( = 0). Panel B reports the same graphs when this correlation is positive (dashed
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line) or negative (solid line).
Insert Figure 4 about here
Insert Figure 5 about here
Panels A show that absent any e¤ect on the covariance with child rearing costs, higher income
volatility implies higher fertility and lower consumption. The intuition for this result is the
channel 3 discussed before: if wealth is not too high, as the amount of risk increases the
household wants to have a child to hedge uncertainty about future utility from consumption
with the deterministic stream of utility provided by the child. As discussed in Figure 1 this
e¤ect vanishes for high levels of wealth. Moreover, the precautionary e¤ect discussed as channel
2 pushes for lower consumption, as it is reected in the downward slopping curve of Figure 5
panel A.
The Panels B of Figures 4 and 5 show that when the income and cost shocks are correlated,
the sign of the correlation is key to understand if higher income volatility speeds up or delays
fertility. When cost shocks hedge income shocks ( > 0) fertility increases in income volatility,
and it decreases when the shocks add to each other ( < 0). This is consistent with the intuition
of Figure 3. Moreover, Figure 5 panel B shows that the reaction of consumption to income
volatility depends on the sign of the correlation between child costs and income. For positive
correlation the shocks hedge each other, hence the precautionary savings demand is smaller and
consumption higher.
Figures 6 and 7 show the reaction of fertility and consumption to the income over wealth
ratio. The fertility reaction is not monotonic. There is a critical level of income-wealth ratio
such that the fertility decision boundary is decreasing before it, and increasing after it. To
understand this result it is useful to start when the ratio is very low, close to zero. In this
case income is very small relative to wealth, and the household has a lot of wealth to easily
bu¤er income shocks. This translates into very high consumption, as can be seen in Figure 7.
Moreover, similarly to the result of Figure 1 panel B, the wealthy household triggers fertility
easily since the risks associated with it are less of a concern. As we move to the right in the
x-axis, the household has less wealth to hedge income uctuations, and this translates into
higher precautionary savings (consumption decreases in Figure 7 although at a slow rate) as
the household starts to be more concerned with assuming childrens risk (the fertility boundary
decreases). However, there is a critical level when the income/wealth ratio is too high, the
household has low wealth relative to her income and channel 3 enters into action. The household
trades o¤ children against consumption because childbearing helps her to smooth future utility,
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hence the fertility boundary becomes increasing. But this pushes her to save more to absorb
more volatile cost shocks in the future, thus consumption starts to decrease at a higher rate
(the slope in Figure 7 becomes more negative). The households at the right hand extreme of
the x-axis illustrate the tradeo¤: they have the larger fertility levels in Figure 6 and the lowest
consumption in Figure 7.
Insert Figure 6 about here
Insert Figure 7 about here
Figure 8 shows that higher expected income growth increases fertility. This is the wealth
e¤ect rst highlighted by Becker (1960) when children are normal goods and there is not quality-
quantity trade-o¤. Figure 9 shows that the same intuition applies to wealth.
Insert Figure 8 about here
Insert Figure 9 about here
Finally, Figure 10 displays another traditional Beckerian e¤ect: higher expected growth in
the costs of raising a child encourages earlier fertility. It is the standard price substitution e¤ect.
It o¤sets the precautionary savings motive because when expected costs get higher, having a
child and enjoying altruistic utility gets expensive relative to future consumption and cheaper
relative to present consumption. Thus the increasing pattern of the decision boundary.
Insert Figure 10 about here
4 Empirical support for the theory
In this section we test if the theoretical results discussed before are consistent with the
data. To do so we identify a variable that can serve as a proxy for the uninsurable volatility
in the costs associated with raising a child. We focus on the distance of the grandparents to
the parents. There are two arguments to support this choice. First, a large fraction of the
uninsurable risks of child rearing seems related to the time costs for the parents. This was
especially true in the U.S. in the late 1980s, when concerns that child care was in short supply,
not of good enough quality, and too expensive for many families prompted the enactment of
legislation in 1990 that expanded Federal support for child care (U.S. Congress 2000). Second,
Cardia and Ng (2003) and Rupert and Zanella (2010) have documented that grandparents make
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substantial time transfers in the form of care of their grandchildren. Hence, we assume that
households whose parents live closeby are better insured face to time costs shocks from raising
a child. We use this variable as a proxy for child cost risk.
Our data are the 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). The NSFH
consists of a national probability sample of persons ages 19 and over who resided in the United
States in 1987 and 1988. It comes with weights which reect unequal probability sampling,
poststratication and nonresponse adjustment and allow us to represent the U.S. population
on age, sex, and race.19 We use the household as our unit of analysis.
We focus on fertility decisions made in the last year. We construct a dummy variable F
which takes the value one if the household had a child in the previous year to taking the NSFH
survey. This dependent variable resembles the dichotomic fertility decision of the model better
than the fertility rate. Moreover, in accordance with the theory, the decision is contemporaneous
to economic indicators such as income, age, race and wealth that are also reported in the NSFH
survey.20
In Table 2 we analyze the marginal inuence of child cost risks on fertility. We estimate the
following probit model
Prob(F = 1jdis;X) = (+ dis dis+ 0X) (24)
where the explanatory variables are the distance of the householder from her parents (dis) and
a set of control variables (X) commonly associated with the decision to have a child or not.
We control for income, wealth, income over wealth, age of the householder, race (Latinos and
African-American), religion and education.  is the standard normal density.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 reports the control variables and the marginal e¤ect on the fertility decision of
each explanatory variable. The higher the distance to parents the smaller the likelihood of
childbearing, consistent with the pattern of Figure 1. The marginal e¤ect of distance is negative
and signicant in all probit specications, each one including an increasing number of controls.
This result supports that higher cost volatility reduces fertility.
In Table 3 we test another prediction of Figure 1, that wealth plays an important role in the
19For a brief overview of the NSFH, see ftp://elaine.ssc.wisc.edu/pub/nsfh/c1intro.002 and
ftp://elaine.ssc.wisc.edu/pub/nsfh/README
20For our work the only drawback of the NSFH is the lack of data on consumption.
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fertility decision. Less wealthy households are less a¤ected by high levels of cost risk, as it is
shown by the convex relation of fertility versus cost risk displayed in Panel A of Figure 1. Panel
B in Figure 1 showed the opposite theoretical result (concave shape). Moreover, the higher the
households risk aversion the more (less) likely is that the less (more) wealthy household will
have a child. We test these predictions by estimating the following probit model
Prob(F = 1jdis; RT ) = (+ dis dis+ RTRT + dis;RTdis RT ) (25)
The variable RT tries to capture the degree of household risk tolerance. It is the ratio of
investments in stocks, bonds and mutual funds relative to the households total wealth. Higher
values of RT denote high risk tolerance, i.e. a lower degree of risk aversion, because a substantial
percentage of the households wealth is invested in risky assets
Insert Table 3 about here
As a robustness check, Table 3 also reports the estimates of a linear probability model
(LPM)
Prob(F = 1jdis; RT ) = + dis dis+ RART + dis;RAdis RT (26)
Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimation for the low wealth sample, that we dene as house-
holds in the lower 5% percentile of the wealth distribution. Panel B reports marginal e¤ects for
medium/high wealth households (those belonging to the top 50% percentile). Consistently with
Figure 1, the marginal e¤ect on fertility of risk tolerance, is positive for medium/high wealth
households and negative for low wealth households. As predicted by the theoretical model the
less (more) wealthy households are more (less) likely to have a child if they are highly risk
averse. Both e¤ects are highly statistically signicant. The LPM model conrms the results
obtained with the probit specication. On the other hand, Table 3 does not allow to claim that
the marginal e¤ect on fertility of distance is di¤erent by wealth group.
Ai and Norton (2003) emphasize the di¢ culty in interpreting interactions in nonlinear mod-
els. The interaction e¤ect cannot be evaluated by looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical
signicance of the coe¢ cient on the conventional interaction term. The interaction e¤ect is
conditional on the independent variable, and therefore both the magnitude and statistical sig-
nicance of the interaction term can vary across observations. We follow Ai and Norton (2003)
to compute the corrected marginal e¤ects and their signicance at every predicted probability.
In Figure 11 we study the e¤ect on fertility of the interaction between distance to parents and
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risk tolerance. Figure 11 reports the marginal e¤ect of the interaction across the medium/high-
wealth and the low-wealth sample, together with the corresponding z-statistics. In Figure 1
our model predicts a positive marginal e¤ect of the interaction for both wealth classes: the
fertility boundary of lower-wealth individuals is less negatively a¤ected by their risk tolerance
when cost volatility increases, while the fertility boundary of higher wealth-individuals is more
positively a¤ected. The empirical evidence reported in Figure 11 seems consistent with the
model for both wealth groups, but in both cases the estimates are not statistically signicant,
as the z-statistics are low in absolute value for most observations.
We now turn to the following probit specication which is concerned with the income e¤ect
and its interaction with distance to parents:
Prob(F = 1jdis; I) = (+ dis dis+ II + dis;Idis  I); (27)
where I denotes income. Estimation results are reported in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
The marginal e¤ect of income on fertility is negative and signicant. This could be consistent
with the theory discussed in Figure 6 because most surveyed households display a low income
over wealth ratio. In Figure 12 we analyze the interaction e¤ect between income and parental
distance following again the methodology of Ai and Norton (2003). The z statistics show that
the marginal e¤ect on fertility of this interaction is positive and statistically signicant for
a signicant portion of the sample. While higher-income households are less prone to child-
bearing per se, they are also less concerned with the risk of uninsurable child costs when making
their fertility decision. According to our model, this could be due to the fact that households
who raise a child face a positive correlation between income and child costs, and they can
achieve a partial o¤set of the two. Indeed, as Table 5 shows, the sample correlation between
income and parental distance is signicantly positive across households who had a child in the
last year, while it is negligible across those who did not.
Insert Table 5 about here
In Section 3 we argued that the elasticity of fertility to the income-over-wealth ratio changes
sign according to the level of income-over-wealth, giving rise to the U-shaped pattern of the fer-
tility boundary observed in Figure 6. We have not identied this pattern in the 1987-88 NSFH
Survey. In the literature, the empirical support for this prediction is at best mixed. Using data
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from Switzerland and Singapore between 1970 and 1990, Hsing and Rios (1995) estimates a
signicant quadratic relationship between fertility rates and per capita GDP. Calibrating his
model to a Brazilian household survey, Veloso (1999) also nds that the cross-section relation-
ship between fertility and wealth displays a U-shaped pattern, reecting di¤erences in wealth
composition between poor and rich families. Willis (1973) analyzes US survey data of 1960
and nds evidence in favor of a U-shaped dependence of fertility on income: in populations
in which wiveseducation levels are low, the e¤ect of income on fertility tends to be negative,
and it becomes positive as these levels grow. More recently, Kremer and Chen (2002) argue
that the fertility di¤erential between uneducated and educated women is most pronounced in
middle income countries and weak in both low and high income countries. This suggests that
an income increase reduces fertility mostly for low income levels.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the joint consumption and fertility decisions of a household
who faces uninsurable shocks to both income and the cost of raising a child, and who can decide
when to have a child. To do so we solved a real options model with incomplete markets and
CRRA preferences.
While in general fertility is negatively a¤ected by child rearing cost volatility, the extent to
which this occurs and the extent to which higher risk aversion postpones or anticipates fertility
depend on households wealth. For low wealth households the utility ows from fertility provide
an insurance mechanism that mitigate the negative impact of cost volatility, inducing more risk
averse households to increase fertility. We also nd that the correlation between income and
child rearing costs substantially alters the fertility decisions. Moreover, our model is consistent
with the nonlinear relation between fertility and income that part of the empirical literature has
identied. In particular, our model implies a U-shaped dependence of fertility on the income
over wealth ratio.
We nd empirical support for most of our theoretical predictions using regression analysis
on data from the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households.
The analysis of this paper can be generalized in a number of directions. For simplicity, we
have not considered life-cycle e¤ects in the households problem. This is a relevant factor in
the timing of fertility as, for example, the ability to be fertile is age dependent. We have also
abstracted from the fact that income is endogenous and fertility alters labor supply. Introducing
this into the model would allow to study career and fertility choices together. In the empirical
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analysis, we focused on a proxy for the uninsurable risks associated with child rearing (the
distance of the grandparents to the parents as a measure of insurance against time costs shocks).
Further empirical work may explore alternative ways to measure the risks associated with child
rearing and the e¤ects on fertility. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Appendix: Solution Approach
First, we consider the value function after the decision to have a child and its HBJ equation
(9). We guess the following functional form for the value function J
J(W; q; y) =
W 1 
r(1  )e
r(1 )G(q^;y^) (28)
where q^ and y^ are, respectively, the ratio between child cost and income over wealth (q^ = q=W
and y^ = y=W ). G is a function to be determined. The decision boundary, denoted by q, is a
critical level of the cost over wealth ratio. Substituting the guess (28) into the HBJ equation
(9), performing the changes of variable q ! q^, y ! y^ and simplifying, we realize that G solves
the nonlinear, non-homogeneous PDE21
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   1)Gy^Gq^qy q^y^ = 0 (29)
Second, we apply a similar guess for the function V which appears in equation (11)
V (W; q; y) =
W 1 
r(1  )e
r(1 )U(q^;y^) (30)
Replacing the guess (30) into the HBJ equation (12) we conclude that U must satisfy the
following partial di¤erential equation
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The solution of these equations cannot be explicitly characterized. We then follow a pertur-
bation approach proposed by Kogan and Uppal (2002) and Bhamra et al. (2007). It consists
on a power series expansion of the value function with respect to the relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient  around the logarithmic utility case ( = 1). We represent both value functions J
21The transversality condition (10) must also hold.
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and V , and the decision boundary q, as power series
J(W; y^; q^) =
1X
i=0
(   1)iJi(W; y^; q^) (32)
V (W; y^; q^) =
1X
i=0
(   1)iVi(W; y^; q^) (33)
q(W; y^) =
1X
i=0
(   1)iqi(W; y^) (34)
Because of our guesses (28) and (30), and because of (32) and (33), G and U also have power
series representations
G(y^; q^) =
1X
i=0
(   1)iGi(y^; q^) (35)
U(y^; q^) =
1X
i=0
(   1)iUi(y^; q^) (36)
Proposition 2 We can check that,22 up to the second-order, the following relations hold be-
tween the power series of J(:) and G (:)
J0(W; y^; q^) =
log(W )
r
+G0(y^; q^) (37)
J1(W; y^; q^) = G1(y^; q^)  1
2r
(rG0(y^; q^) + log(W ))
2 (38)
J2(W; y^; q^) = G2(y^; q^) G1(y^; q^)(G0(y^; q^)r + log(W )) + 1
6r
(rG0(y^; q^) + log(W ))
3 (39)
The power series of V (:) and U (:) have a similar relation up to the second-order.
Now we discuss how we characterize the functions Gi and Ui for i = 0; 1; 2: The case i = 0
22To check this, we develop the right hand side of (28) into a power series around  = 1. Then we substitute
G = G0 + (   1)G1 + (   1)2G2
and group terms proportional to (   1) and (   1)2
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corresponds to  = 1, the logarithmic utility case. G0 solves equation (29) when  ! 1. It is
G0(y^; q^) = K1 +K2y^ +K3q^ (40)
K1 =
log r
r
(41)
K2 =
1
r(r   y) (42)
K3 =
1
r(q   r) (43)
The transversality condition implies y < r and q < r.
U0 solves equation (31) when  ! 1. It is
U0(y^; q^) = K1 +K2y^ +K3q^
 (44)
K1 =
log r
r
(45)
K2 =
1
r(r   y) (46)
where  is the negative solution of the quadratic equation23
(   1)2q=2 + q   r = 0 (47)
Once G0 and U0 are known we can use relation (37) to get J0 and V0: Then, substituting J0
and V0 into the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions gives the constant K3 and the
decision boundary q0
q0 =

K3
K3
 1
 1
(48)
K3 = [(  1)(1  )] 1


K3
 
(49)
Equation (48) states that the decision boundary is constant for the household with logarithmic
preferences.
To characterize the rst-order terms G1, U1; and q1, we substitute
G = G0 + (   1)G1 (50)
23By direct substitution, we realize that (44) solves the HBJ equation (31) for the logarithmic case provided
that the quadratic equation (47) holds. Selecting  as the negative solution of this equation insures that the
no-bubble condition (13) is satised.
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and
U = U0 + (   1)U1 (51)
into equations (29) and (31), respectively, and take into account the HBJ equation solved by
the solutions G0 and V0 of the logarithmic case. We conclude that G1 solves the following
linear, non-homogeneous PDE
rG1 = G1q^q q^ +G1y^yy^ +G1q^q^
2q
2
q^2 +G1y^y^
2y
2
y^2 +G1y^q^yqy^q^
  rG20q^
2q
2
q^2   rG20y^
2y
2
y^2   rG0y^G0y^qy q^y^  1
2
( G0r + log(r))2 (52)
The function V1 solves an identical PDE. We guess the following functional forms for the
solutions to these equations and for the rst order exercise boundary q1(W; y^)
G1 = C4y^q^ + C5q^
2 + C6y^
2 (53)
U1 = C4y^q^
 + C5y^
2 + C6q^
2 + F1q^
1 + F 2y^q^
2 (54)
q1 = A+By^ (55)
where constantsA, B, F 1 and F 2 are identied by substituting (54)-(55) into the value-matching
and smooth pasting conditions, by taking into account the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions of the household with logarithmic preferences,24 and by matching coe¢ cients that
are proportional to the powers of y^. The remaining constants are identied by the di¤erential
equation (52) and its counterpart for V1:
The second order terms G2, U2 and q2 are obtained applying a similar procedure. In general,
the n th order exercise boundary is a n degree polynomial in y^. The next propositions
summarize our power series approximation to the value functions J and V 25
Proposition 3 After the decision to have a child, the value function of the household is, to
the second-order in ,
J(W; y^; q^) =
log(W )
r
+G0 + (   1)

G1   1
2r
(rG0 + log(W ))
2

(56)
+ (   1)2

G2  G1(G0r + log(W )) + 1
6r
(rG0 + log(W ))
3

24I.e., the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions satised by the the zero-th order value function
(U0), and fertility boundary (q0) :
25We do not report coe¢ cients appearing in rst and second-order terms, but they are available upon request.
28
where G0 is given in (40), while G1 and G2 are
G1(y^; q^) = C4y^q^ + C5y^
2 + C6q^
2 (57)
G2(y^; q^) = D4y^q^ +D5q^
2 +D6y^
2 +D7q^
2y^ +D8y^
2q^ +D9q^
3 +D10y^
3 (58)
Proposition 4 Before the decision to have a child, the value function of the household is
V + 1
(1 )r , where V is, to the second order in ,
V (W; y^; q^) =
log(W )
r
+ U0 + (   1)

U1   1
2r
(rU0 + log(W ))
2

(59)
+ (   1)2

U2   U1(U0r + log(W )) + 1
6r
(rU0 + log(W ))
3

where U0 is given in (44) while U1 and U2 are
U1(y^; q^) =C4y^q^
 + C5y^
2 + C6q^
2 + F 1q^
 + F 2y^q^
1 (60)
U2(y^; q^) =D4y^q^
 +D5y^
2 +D6q^
2 +D7q^
2 y^ +D8y^
2q^ +D9q^
3 +D10y^
3 +D12y^
2q^2 (61)
+D13q^
1 y^ +D15q^
1+ +D16q^
2+ y^ + L1q^
1 + L2q^
2 y^ + L3q^
3 y^2
where
1 =  (62)
2 = 1 (63)
while 1 and 3 are, respectively, the negative roots of the following quadratic equations
1(1   1)
2y
2
+ 1(q + yq) + y   r = 0 (64)
1
2
3(3   1)2q + 3(q + qy)  r + 2y + 2y = 0 (65)
To obtain the second order representation of the households consumption rule we apply
the same methodology that we have used to obtain J and V . Basically, before the childbearing
decision, from equation (12) the households optimal consumption must satisfy
c = V
  1

W (66)
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If we denote by c^ = c=W the consumption over wealth ratio, then our guess (30) leads to
c^(q^; y^) =
1
r 
1

er
 1

U(q^;y^): (67)
Expanding (67) to the second-order in  around  = 1, substituting
U = U0 + (   1)U1 + (   1)2U2 (68)
and grouping terms proportional to ( 1) and ( 1)2, we obtain the households consumption
rule before the childbearing decision reported in Proposition 1. I.e.
c^ = r + (   1)(U0r2   rlog(r))+
(   1)2

 U0r2 + U1r2 + U
2
0 r
3
2
+ r log r   U0r2 log r + 1
2
r(log r)2

To obtain the consumption rule after the childbearing decision we follow the same steps but
now using equations (9) and (28). We obtain
c^ = r + (   1)(G0r2   rlog(r))+
(   1)2

 G0r2 +G1r2 + G
2
0r
3
2
+ r log r  G0r2 log r + 1
2
r(log r)2

(69)
It remains to show that the value function before the childrearing decision is decreasing in
the current cost over wealth ratio, that is
H(W0; q0; y0)  H( ~W0; ~q0; y0) for q0=W0  ~q0= ~W0
By a dynamic programming principle,26 the value function H(W0; q0; y0) can be written as
H(W0; q0; y0) = sup
c;
E
Z 
0
e rs
c1 s   1
1   ds+ J(W ; q ; y )

+
1
r(1  ) (70)
Let   denote the optimal time to have a child and c the optimal consumption policy.
Since q0=W0  ~q0= ~W0, either we have q0  ~q0, or W0  ~W0, or both. In either case, the policies
  and c are feasible also when the consumption-over wealth ratio is q0=W0. In particular,
by standard comparison theorems for stochastic di¤erential equations, we have q  ~q and
26This argument is adapted from Miao and Wang (2007).
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W  ~W. It then follows that
H(W0; q0; y0) > E
Z

0
e rs
cs
1    1
1   ds+ J(W ; q ; y)

+
1
r(1  ) >
E
Z

0
e rs
cs
1    1
1   ds+ J(
~W ; ~q ; y)

+
1
r(1  ) = H(
~W0; ~q0; y0) (71)
The last inequality follows from the fact that the value function after childrearing (J) is in-
creasing in wealth and decreasing in cost, while the rst follows from the optimality principle
(70).
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Tables
Table 1: Benchmark calibration
q = 0:02 y = q y = 0:05
r = 0:5  = 2 q = y
 = 3  = 0
Notes: This table shows the parameters used to nu-
merically solve the model and construct the gures
of Section 3. The parameter values are discussed in
page 11.
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Table 2: Probit Regressions on the Determinants of Fertility
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable for having had a child last year
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Distance to the parents -0.00005** -0.00005** -0.00004** -0.00004** -0.00004*
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Income -0.0828** -0.0032 0.0058 0.0085
(0.0423) (0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0375)
Wealth 0.0017 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024
(0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0031) ( 0.0031)
Income/Wealth 0.00032 0.00032 0.00032 0.00032
(0.00028) (0.00020) ( 0.00025) (0.00024)
Age of householder -0.009*** -0.00923*** -0.00953***
(0.00100) (0.00152) (0.00151)
Dummy for being latino 0.0288 0.02079
( 0.05689) (0.05630)
Dummy for being black 0.0516* 0.0459
(0.03077) (0.03090)
Dummy for nonreligious person -0.06694**
(0.026)
Education Level -0.00213
( 0.00525)
Observations 1056 1056 1056 1055 1048
Notes: This table shows the marginal e¤ects arising from the estimation of Equation (24) on 1987-
88 NFSH household data. The marginal e¤ect is calculated as dF=dx at the sample mean of x for
continuous variables. When x is a dummy variable dF=dx is a discrete change from 0 to 1. The
dependent variable F , is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the household had a child
in the last year. Income and wealth are measured as multiples of US$ 100,000. The estimation
included a constant. Robust standards errors are in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, and *** mean
statistically di¤erent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% level of signicance.
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Table 3: E¤ects of Risk Tolerance on Fertility by Wealth Level
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable for having had a child last year
A. Low Wealth
LPM Probit
Distance to the parents -0.0001** -.00021
(0.000045) (0.0021)
Risk Tolerance (RT) -2.34401*** -16.8461**
(0.6073) (7.7682)
Distance*RT 0.00345 0.14679
(0.00389) (0.1095)
Observations 52 52
B. Medium/High Wealth
LPM Probit
Distance to the parents -0.000319* -0.000248
(0.0000171) (0.00016)
Risk Tolerance (RT) 0.19644** 0.6831**
(0.01) (0.3086)
Distance*RT 0.0000428 0.00033
( 0.00013) (0.00046)
Observations 515 515
Notes: This table shows the marginal e¤ects arising from the estimation of Equations 25 and 26
on 1987-88 NFSH household data. The estimation included a constant. We proxy risk tolerance
with the ratio between investments in stocks, bonds and mutual funds relative to household wealth.
Robust standards errors are in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, and *** mean statistically di¤erent
from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% level of signicance. Low wealth means below 5% wealth percentile
in the sample, while medium/high wealth is the upper 50% percentile. Figure 11 reports the
interaction e¤ects and corresponding z-statistics of the interaction variable computed according to
Ai and Norton (2003).
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Table 4: E¤ects of Income on Fertility
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable for having had a child last year
Distance to the parents -0.00044**
(0.00019)
Income -0.415**
(0.207)
Distance*Income 0.0006
(0.000044)
Observations 1048
Notes: This table shows the marginal e¤ects arising from the estimation of Equation 27 on
1987-88 NFSH household data. The estimation included a constant. Income is measured
as multiples of US$ 100,000. Robust standards errors are in parenthesis. The symbols *,
**, and *** mean statistically di¤erent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% level of signicance.
Figure 12 reports the interaction e¤ects and corresponding z-statistics of the interaction
variable computed according to Ai and Norton (2003).
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Table 5: Correlation of Income and Distance to Parents
Did the household have a child during the last year? Yes No
Correlation of Income and Distance to the parents 0.226 0.0083
Observations 188 860
Notes: This table shows the correlation between income and the distance to parents.
The column on the left reports the correlation for those households who had a child
in the last year, while the column on the right reports the correlation for those
households who did not have a child. Data are from the 1987-88 NFSH Survey.
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Figure 1: Fertility as a function of cost volatility. Panel A reports the fertility decision
boundary (critical cost over wealth ratio at which the household takes the fertility decision) as
a function of cost volatility, when the households wealth is the 2007 median U.S. household
as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). The solid, dashed, and dotted line correspond
to a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient  of 2.2, 2, and 1.1, respectively. Panel B reports the
boundary as a function of volatility, when households wealth is in the highest percentile of the
2007 Households net worth distribution (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
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Figure 2: Consumption as a function of cost volatility. Panel A reports the consumption
over wealth ratio as a function of cost volatility, when the households wealth is the 2007 median
U.S. household as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). The solid, dashed, and dotted
line correspond to a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient  of 2.2, 2, and 1.1, respectively. Panel B
reports the consumption over wealth ratio as a function of volatility, when households wealth is
high, namely in the highest percentile of the 2007 Households net worth distribution according
to the U.S. Census Bureau (2010).
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Figure 3: Fertility as a function of the correlation between income and cost growth. This
Figure reports the fertility decision boundary (critical cost over wealth ratio at which the
household takes the fertility decision) as a function of the correlation between shocks to income
growth (dy=y) and to cost growth (dq=q).
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Figure 4: Fertility as a function of volatility of income growth. Panel A reports the fertility
decision boundary (critical cost over wealth ratio at which the household takes the fertility
decision) as a function of volatility of income growth, when the correlation between income and
child rearing costs is zero. Panel B reports the same graph when this correlation is positive
(dashed line) or negative (solid line).
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Figure 5: Consumption as a function of volatility of income growth. Panel A reports the
consumption over wealth ratio as a function of volatility of income growth, when the correlation
between income and child rearing costs is zero. Panel B reports the same graph but when this
correlation is positive (dashed line) or negative (solid line).
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Figure 6: Fertility as a function of the income to wealth ratio. This gure reports the
fertility decision boundary (critical cost over wealth ratio at which the household takes the
fertility decision) as a function of the current income level relative to wealth.
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Figure 7: Consumption as a function of the income to wealth ratio. This gure reports the
consumption over wealth ratio as a function of the current income level relative to wealth.
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Figure 8: Fertility as a function of expected income growth. This Figure reports the fertility
decision boundary (critical cost over wealth ratio at which the household takes the fertility
decision) as a function of expected income growth.
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Figure 9: Fertility as a function of wealth. This gure reports the fertility decision boundary
(critical cost over wealth ratio at which the household takes the fertility decision) as a function
of current wealth.
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Figure 10: Fertility as a function of expected cost growth. This gure reports the fertility
decision boundary (critical cost over wealth ratio at which the household takes the fertility
decision) as a function of the expected growth in the costs of child rearing.
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Figure 11: Marginal e¤ect of the interaction between distance and risk tolerance on fertility
after probit. This gure complements Table 3. It reports the marginal e¤ect and corresponding
z-statistics of the interaction variable (parental distance*risk tolerance) on the dummy variable
for having had a child in the last year. The interaction is estimated following the methodology
proposed by Ai and Norton (2003). The lines above and below zero in the gures located on
the right side represent the 10% signicance levels. The upper level row has the results for the
low wealth case (below 5% wealth percentile in the sample). The row at the bottom has the
results for the medium/high wealth case (upper 50% wealth percentile in the sample).
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Figure 12: Marginal e¤ect of the interaction between distance and income on fertility after
probit. This gure complements Table 4. It reports the marginal e¤ect and corresponding
z-statistics of the interaction variable (distance*income) on the dummy variable for having had
a child in the last year. They are estimated following the methodology proposed by Ai and
Norton (2003). The lines above and below zero in the gures located on the right side represent
the 10% signicance levels.
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